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Commentary 
 
Will coronavirus cause a big city exodus? 
 
What does the pandemic mean for the future of cities? We’ve seen predictions that COVID-19 
is an ‘extinction-level event’ for expensive, commuter-driven megacities. We’ve also seen 
confidence: if the ‘death of distance’ didn’t finish off big cities in the 1980s, why should this 
time be different?  
 
These debates are bound up – in the UK and US, at least – with worries about empty city centres 
and working from home. At the time of writing, a majority of UK workers is commuting at 
least once a week (Figure 1, left). But city centre footfall – especially in the biggest places – 
remains well down (Figure 1, right). And within big cities like London, footfall is shifting from 
cores to suburbs (Anderson, Hesketh et al. 2020).    
 
Figure 1. Left: Where are people working? Right: Footfall by city size. 
 
 
Is this the beginning of the end for big cities? Academics have been quick to make predictions 
(Batty 2020, Couclelis 2020, Florida, Rodríguez-Pose et al. 2020, Kellerman 2020, Kleinman 
2020). How should we assess the possibilities? A key uncertainty is how working from home 
affects productivity and innovation. A second is how we exit the pandemic. Exploring these 
issues helps us understand how big cities could now evolve.  
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1/ Remote possibilities  
Home working is increasingly feasible for many activities, including complex tasks requiring 
interaction (Clancy 2020). So why isn’t it more common? One barrier is practicality. In most 
countries, the nature of the work – the ‘task content’ – means only a minority of jobs can be 
done from home – around 44% in the UK (Dingel and Neiman 2020). Another barrier is inertia. 
Pre-pandemic, only 27% of UK workers had ever worked from home: a big gap (Office for 
National Statistics 2020). This gap has now closed: in a recent survey regular remote working 
had risen from 6% pre-pandemic to 43% by the end of June (Felstead and Reuschke 2020). 
That share will be higher in big cities.  
 
As Clancy notes, even if remote working is not be as effective as face to face, firms may trade-
off less effective working practices for cost savings. The effect on productivity of the current 
shift is unknown. Newly-remote urban office workers work longer days, have more, but 
shorter, meetings and do more email (DeFilippis, Impink et al. 2020). While 29% of workers 
in Felstead and Reuschke’s survey report higher output, 30% say it had fallen.  
 
We also lack robust pre-pandemic evidence. In specific cases – patent examining or call centres 
(Bloom, Liang et al. 2014, Choudhury, Foroughi et al. 2020) – shifting to remote working 
increased productivity. This tells us how existing teams adjust but says little about long term 
change. Those dynamics matter. Physically co-located workers – in workplaces, but also in 
incubators, accelerators and science parks – can learn more easily from each other, and develop 
and test new ideas (Madaleno, Nathan et al. 2018).  These effects extend beyond the firm. 
Physical proximity in cities increases innovation, and this link remains strong, even as remote 
working tools have improved and travel costs have fallen (Duranton and Puga 2020). Dense 
urban areas are good at generating unconventional ideas (Berkes and Gaetani 2019) including 
through serendipitous interaction (Atkin, Chen et al. 2019). Even as new ideas diffuse, their 
birthplace retains disproportionate job shares in related activities (Bloom, Hassan et al. 2020). 
Learning is especially important for younger workers, who experience bigger wage gains when 
moving to urban cores (De La Roca and Puga 2017).  
 
This raises the question of the private versus the social benefits of proximity. Even if shifting 
to home working makes individual firms more productive, cities could still lose the collective 
benefits of between-firm and worker interaction. Of course, mass remote workarounds for face 
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to face may emerge (Page 2020). And constraints on face-to-face interaction can also alter the 
direction of innovation, in ways that might bring benefits (Andrews 2019).  But these latter 
possibilities are highly speculative.  
 
Firms will continue to experiment with ways of reorganising office work in the coming months. 
The longer the period of forced experiment, the more firms and their workers can figure out 
what works for them. This is one of many reasons why the length of the pandemic will matter.       
  
2/ Early exit  
An effective vaccine available from mid-2021 will mean a rapid end to the disruptions caused 
by lockdowns and social distancing. Unfortunately, temporary shocks – such as lockdown – 
could have permanent scarring effects. The resilience literature suggests that richer regions, 
with more educated workforces, bounce back faster from recessions.   
 
We should not assume a rapid return to pre-COVID norms. The pandemic may change longer-
term behaviour – even if we exit early. Expectations about the likelihood of future pandemics 
may change, and that could shift preferences for big city living. The forced experiment of mass 
remote working could also act as a collective nudge. If this overcomes organisational inertia, 
working from home could permanently increase.  These shifts, and others, are more likely if 
exit from the pandemic happens later.  
 
3/ Exit later 
What if a vaccine is two to three years away or – rather less likely – that COVID-19 becomes 
less infectious, or herd immunity emerges? This prolongs forced experimentation and moves 
us further from old norms.   
 
If working from home does become an effective substitute for face-to-face interaction – and 
this is debatable – then it could increase the spatial footprint of more dynamic firms and cities  
as commuting does, but at lower economic, social and environmental costs. If this vision of 
workers in rural idylls dialling into high-paying, big city jobs sounds familiar, that’s because it 
is: mass telecommuting, first promised decades ago, will have arrived.   
 
One challenge to this rosy outlook is greater offshoring: if a task can be done anywhere, why 
not outside the UK? A second challenge is that profound reductions in transport and 
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telecommunication costs generate further shifts in geographies of people and jobs, as changes 
in location preferences work through the urban system.  
 
For home-working households, less commuting weakens the link between residential and work 
location. This means non-work considerations can play a bigger role in choosing where to live. 
In the UK, housing shortages and unresponsive supply make large population adjustments 
unfeasible. Instead, any significant drop in demand for big cities will produce higher house 
prices in desirable non-urban locations. Higher-paid jobs are more amenable to remote 
working, reinforcing these price effects. A similar story could play out within cities, with 
wealthier households moving to desirable suburbs. These shifts will reinforce spatial 
segregation, rather than ‘levelling up’.  
 
Wealthy households moving to the suburbs also increase demand for high-end shops, 
restaurants and gyms in those neighbourhoods. Will we see one-for-one shifts of activity from 
central cities to suburbs? This will depend on the extent to which households substitute home 
production, local or online purchases for the services they used to consume while at work. 
Many workers may make their own lunch when working from home Some shopping will shift 
to local businesses but it will also move online. Lockdown has seen many households substitute 
online shopping for physical retail (Relihan, Ward Jr. et al. 2020). Offsetting this is reduced 
expenditure on commuting and office clothing; against that, there is higher spending on office 
equipment and energy at home.  
 
What about office work? A shift to home working lowers demand for office space and even as 
firms hold onto offices, many are already renegotiating or withholding rents. But companies 
are also experimenting, reorganising roles and workflows. One decision for firms is what tasks 
need to be done in the office, under social distancing if required. Another decision is when 
these tasks will be done - city traders who need fast, bespoke internet connections may need to 
be always-in, for example. Companies will need to figure out the impacts of home versus office 
working, and change management practices around this.  
 
All this makes it hard to predict the future of urban office markets. We may see a lot more full-
time remote working, or more mixed patterns (‘in five days in ten’). In the former case, total 
demand for office space will be lower. In the latter, total demand may be the same or higher. 
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US firms surveyed in June predicted zero change in future demand for space (Altig, Barrero et 
al. 2020).  
 
The wider geographical affects are also hard to predict. Falling transaction costs could lead to 
more concentration, with front office activities in city centres while ‘back office’ activities 
move to the suburbs. Functional specialisation could see headquarters increasingly 
concentrated in bigger cities, while smaller cities specialise in production.  
 
4/ No exit  
In the absence of an effective vaccine, declining infectiousness or herd immunity, Covid-19 
will stay endemic, and will need to be managed through large-scale testing, track and trace and, 
if that fails, local lockdowns (Aleta, Martín-Corral et al. 2020). Where would this leave big 
cities?  
 
One key question is whether big cities are more vulnerable to Covid-19, or future pandemics. 
Big cities have long been hard hit by disease but evidence on Covid-19 is limited. Contact-
tracing studies highlight how prolonged exposure in crowded, enclosed environments and 
events spreads the virus (Cevik, Marcus et al. 2020). Yet this doesn’t mean that size, density 
or connectivity makes big cities inherently riskier. 
 
In the UK and elsewhere, the biggest, densest cities were hit earlier. But allowing for timing, 
there may be no link between Covid-19 death rates and density (Carozzi, Provenzano et al. 
2020). Other factors may offset the proximity disadvantage of big cities: younger than average 
populations, for example, and more residents who can reduce exposure by changing behaviour. 
If these findings generalise, economic, physical or demographic characteristics – reliance on 
public transport, crowded housing, physically and economically exposed work in frontline 
services, and concentrations of vulnerable groups – may better explain the spread of Covid-19. 
While these are features of many big cities, especially in more deprived neighbourhoods, they 
are also characteristics of poorer small cities and towns – where coronavirus cases are now 
high.    
 
A radical shift in economic geography becomes more likely as the time to exit increases. A 
long crisis could alter beliefs about the likelihood of future pandemics, thus changing 
behaviour. Slow exit also allows further development of remote working practices and 
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technologies. Diffusion lags can be lengthy: two decades passed before factories took full 
advantage of electrification, for example (David 1990). Large-scale shocks can also lead to 
permanent  shifts – between ‘multiple equilibria’ – even if  underlying fundamentals don’t 
change. The benefits of co-location reduce when everyone is working from home.  This reduces 
the individual benefits of a return to the office, even if there would be collective benefits from 
doing so.    
 
‘No exit’ could also lead to other, long-term transformations. For example, for older 
households, more vulnerable to the disease, the benefits of home working will increase, while 
the amenity benefits of cities will weaken. As the young are less vulnerable, the demography 
of city centres could get even younger, while older households move to the suburbs or out of 
cities entirely. 
 
Other adjustments will be needed. For example, can cities that rely on public transport find 
innovative commuting arrangements that manage congestion and allow employment to remain 
concentrated in the city centre (Hidalgo 2020)? How will they manage this given falling tax 
revenues, if demand for office space falls and takes some local services with it?  
 
5/ Conclusions 
The virus has already altered patterns of working, shopping and social interaction: the question 
is whether – and how – these continue.  
 
Time to exit will shape big city futures.  National differences will also matter. In countries with 
effective public health responses, change will be voluntary: as public confidence returns, firms 
and households can try out new ways of organising life and work (Parnell 2020). By contrast, 
in countries where the virus response is poor, forced adaptation will continue with all the 
difficulties that entails.  
 
There will be other globalised pandemics. And cities still need to address larger, pre-existing 
challenges: most obviously, climate change. The way in which cities adapt to the current crisis, 
and the lessons learned for other challenges, may be as important as the novel coronavirus 
itself.   
 
  
 7 
Max Nathan  
 
University College London & Centre for Economic Performance. Corresponding author.  
max.nathan@ucl.ac.uk  
 
Henry Overman 
 
London School of Economics and Political Science & Centre for Economic Performance 
h.g.overman@lse.ac.uk  
 
An earlier version of this piece was published on the UKRI Economics Observatory.  
 
 
References  
Aleta, A., D. Martín-Corral, A. Pastore y Piontti, M. Ajelli, M. Litvinova, M. Chinazzi, N. E. Dean, M. 
E. Halloran, I. M. Longini Jr, S. Merler, A. Pentland, A. Vespignani, E. Moro and Y. Moreno (2020). 
"Modelling the impact of testing, contact tracing and household quarantine on second waves of COVID-
19." Nature Human Behaviour. 
 
Altig, D., J. M. Barrero, N. Bloom, S. J. Davis, B. H. Meyer and N. Parker (2020). "Surveying Business 
Uncertainty." National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series No. 25956. 
 
Anderson, D., R. Hesketh, M. Kleinman and J. Portes (2020). A Global City in a Global Pandemic: 
Assessing the Ongoing Impact of COVID Induced Trends on London’s Economic Sectors. GLO 
Discussion Paper Series 608. London, Global Labor Organization (GLO). 
 
Andrews, M. (2019). Bar Talk: Informal Social Interactions, Alcohol Prohibition, and Invention. SSRN 
Working Paper 3849466. 
 
Atkin, D., K. Chen and A. Popov (2019). The returns to face-to-face interactions: Knowledge spillovers 
in Silicon Valley. Mimeo. 
 
Batty, M. (2020). "The Coronavirus crisis: What will the post-pandemic city look like?" Environment 
and Planning B 47(4): 547–552. 
 
Berkes, E. and R. Gaetani (2019). The Geography of Unconventional Innovation. Rotman School of 
Management Working Paper No. 3423143, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3423143 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3423143  
 
Bloom, N., T. A. Hassan, A. Kalyani, J. Lerner and A. Tahoun (2020). The Geography of New 
Technologies. INET Working Paper 126. 
 
Bloom, N., J. Liang, J. Roberts and Z. J. Ying (2014). "Does Working from Home Work? Evidence 
from a Chinese Experiment *." The Quarterly Journal of Economics 130(1): 165-218. 
 
Carozzi, F., S. Provenzano and S. Roth (2020). Urban Density and COVID-19 IZA Discussion Paper 
13440. Bonn, IZA. 
 
 8 
Cevik, M., J. Marcus, C. Buckee and T. Smith (2020). SARS-CoV-2 Transmission Dynamics Should 
Inform Policy. vailable at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3692807 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3692807  
 
Choudhury, P., C. Foroughi and B. Zepp Larson (2020). "Work-from-Anywhere: The Productivity 
Effects of Geographic Flexibility." Academy of Management Proceedings 2020(1): 21199. 
 
Clancy, M. (2020). The Case for Remote Work. Economics Working Papers 20007. Iowa, Iowa State 
University. 
 
Couclelis, H. (2020). "There will be no Post-COVID city." Environment and Planning B: Urban 
Analytics and City Science 47(7): 1121-1123. 
 
David, P. A. (1990). "The Dynamo and the Computer: An Historical Perspective on the Modern 
Productivity Paradox." The American Economic Review 80(2): 355-361. 
 
De La Roca, J. and D. Puga (2017). "Learning by Working in Big Cities." The Review of Economic 
Studies 84(1): 106-142. 
 
DeFilippis, E., S. M. Impink, M. Singell, J. T. Polzer and R. Sadun (2020). Collaborating During 
Coronavirus: The Impact of COVID-19 on the Nature of Work. NBER Working Paper 27612. 
Cambridge, MA, NBER. No. 27612. 
 
Dingel, J. I. and B. Neiman (2020). "How many jobs can be done at home?" Journal of Public 
Economics 189: 104235. 
 
Duranton, G. and D. Puga (2020). "The Economics of Urban Density." Journal of Economic 
Perspectives. 
 
Felstead, A. and D. Reuschke (2020). Homeworking in the UK: Before and During the 2020 Lockdown. 
WISERD Report. Cardiff Wales Institute of Social and Economic Research. 
 
Florida, R., A. Rodríguez-Pose and M. Storper (2020). Cities in a Post-COVID world. Papers in 
Evolutionary Economic Geography # 20.41. Utrecht, Utrecht University. 
 
Hidalgo, C. A. (2020). "Trillion dollar streets." Environment and Planning B: Urban Analytics and City 
Science 47(7): 1133-1135. 
 
Kellerman, A. (2020). "The post-Corona city: Virus imprints and precautions." Environment and 
Planning B: Urban Analytics and City Science 47(7): 1124-1127. 
 
Kleinman, M. (2020). "Policy challenges for the post-pandemic city." Environment and Planning B: 
Urban Analytics and City Science 47(7): 1136-1139. 
 
Madaleno, M., M. Nathan, H. Overman and S. Waights (2018). Incubators, Accelerators and Regional 
Economic Development CEP Discussion Paper No 1575. London, LSE. 
 
Office for National Statistics (2020). "Coronavirus and homeworking in the UK labour market: 2019 "  
https://www.ons.gov.uk/employmentandlabourmarket/peopleinwork/employmentandemployeetypes/a
rticles/coronavirusandhomeworkingintheuklabourmarket/2019. 
 
Page, S. (2020). "The Coronavirus and Innovation."  https://items.ssrc.org/covid-19-and-the-social-
sciences/policy-models-in-pandemic/the-coronavirus-and-innovation/. 
 
 9 
Parnell, S. (2020). "The enabling conditions of post-pandemic city government." Environment and 
Planning B: Urban Analytics and City Science 47(7): 1143-1145. 
 
Relihan, L. E., M. M. Ward Jr., C. W. Wheat and D. Farrell (2020). The early impact of COVID-19 on 
local commerce: Changes in spend across neighborhoods and online. CEP Occasional Paper 50. 
London, Centre for Economic Performance. 
 
 
